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Abstract 
This article links theory and politics in a systematic way by proposing Is-Shall-Do as a 
didactical model for analysing a concrete conjuncture, relating it to the desired future in the 
form of a concrete utopia. Aware of structural limits and potential space of manoeuvre for 
political agency adequate practical steps to implement the concrete utopia are elaborated. The 
paper is divided in a first section which exposes three interwoven aspects of development: the 
the idea of a good life, the complexity and multi-dimensionality of development and the 
relationship of knowledge and power. Section two exposes the model of Is-Shall-Do 
abstractly, while section 3 exemplifies it by exposing the challenges for the European left. 
The analysis of conjuncture as a concrete analysis of a concrete situation is centred in Europe 
today on the topic of inequality produced by finance-based accumulation. As the concrete 
utopia of a good life , the authors propose the values of the French revolution, freedom, 
equality and solidarity which are unfulfilled promises of European development. The paper 
ends with a plea for organising democratic and egalitarian alternatives.  
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This paper tries to understand socioeconomic dynamics with the practical objective of 
elaborating normatively rooted strategies for emancipatory change. Interest in the future must 
not be de-connected from understanding the past and the present. The search for the new does 
not start from an empty sheet, but often mobilises past experiences. A contemporary example 
is Venezuela´s Bolivarian revolution and its search for socialism of the 21
st
 century which 
relates to the 19
th
 century liberation struggle. The scientific and political undertaking of 
DEMOLOGOS is to fight collective amnesia and to insist on the power of emerging new 
visions of socioeconomic development
1
. Theoretically, DEMOLOGOS links “old“ 
institutionalist theories to political ecology, a territorialized regulation approach and cultural 
political economy. It analyses discourses, institutions and structures at interlocked spatial 
scales. Empirically, DEMOLOGOS connects past development trajectories to current 
emblematic moments, thereby elaborating strategic perspectives for emancipatory agency.  
The task of this paper is theoretical and practical. It presents a didactical model to grasp 
development in its multiple, but related dimensions
2
. Shall-Is-Do is a model composed of 
three steps. It links a conjunctional analysis of the current situation with an ethically based 
concrete utopia which permits elaborating political strategies. In Latin America it has been 
part of participatory techniques in social movements, labelled “See – Judge – Act”3 and might 
get relevant for critical research with political intentions as well
4
. The solution we propose is 
not simply a better analysis, but a plea for phronesis, the form of rationality the Greek 
philosophers used for solving concrete problems
5
. The presented model for analysing and 
shaping development is transdisciplinary and problem-centred. After presenting the model 
abstractly in section 2, it is applied to grasp current challenges for the European left in section 
3. 
1. Theory and practice of development 
To study the theory and practice of development has to take three interwoven aspects into 
account. First, development as the idea of good life which we aim to realize has to be 
differentiated from development as a process. Development as a normative idea is an 
underlying concept of many of contemporary theories of social and political intervention, 
deeply rooted in Western philosophy. Nussbaum goes back to Aristotle to elaborate a 
multidimensional concept of development as a good life for all
6
. Development must not be 
confounded with growth and progress
7
. Progress, “potentially limitless”, is connoted to the 
“linear unfolding of the universal potential for human improvement”8. It is the liberal creed 
that development – subsumed as material improvement and economic growth - will follow 
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spontaneously in case the state removes the constraints on a free civil society. But capitalist 
development is “terrible and tragic convergence, sealed with victims’ blood”9, a movement of 
“creative destruction”10 which is the opposite of states of equilibrium proposed by 
neoclassical economics. J.S. Mill, a liberal social reformer, while exalting competition and the 
market, was critical about the glaring inequality in the distribution of property
11
 This is also 
true for Marx who “did contrast the positive intention of development with that 
“development” which had happened in the name of progress”12 It was the dark side of 
progress – poverty, unemployment and social disintegration – that gave rise to the positivist 
idea of development as conscious human intervention. Auguste Comte and Saint Simon in 
France, Chamberlain in Britain and Mill and Burke in India understood development as the 
coalescence of progress and order. This intention to develop is not only different from the 
liberal understanding of progressive development, it is its opposite. While liberal theories 
trusted in the invisible hand of the market, more critical voices ascribed a decisive role to the 
visible hand of human actors, especially the state
13
. Especially after World War II, the nation 
state was the power container used to implement development strategies with a strong focus 
on growth and modernisation. Since the 1960s, critical theories aimed at dethroning these 
economistic approaches to development
14
. Today, social indicators, as for example the 
Human Development Indicator (HDI), offer important and politically relevant tools to 
measure development. However, all too often, political discourse and mainstream economics 
still privilege GDP growth as the prime indicator for development and promote 
competitiveness as its main objective.  
Second, socio-economic development as an integral and articulated process needs multiple 
explanations. Economists, all too often, focus on economising
15
, offering a model of 
optimisation and one respective explanation. But the economy has to be understood as an 
ensemble of socio-cultural, political and economic relations, as an integral economy
16
. From 
the 18
th
 century onwards different theories of political economy, culminating in Marx critique, 
have perceived that there is no single logic of capital, but the concrete confrontation of 
different strategies of fractions of capital, labour, states and movements which shape 
development and make history and geography
17
. Capitalism is a mode of production and a 
social system. The structure of class domination, based on the uneven access to the means of 
production, is secured by a complex interplay of governance and regulation, scrutinized in 
DEMOLOGOS
18
. Political ecology, cultural political economy, historical-geographical 
materialism and institutionalism are inspiring recent elaborations of this tradition
19
. They 
perceive reality as a process which has no stable essence, but is created and re-created. The 
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Marxist tradition emphasises production as the base of social life and labour as the key 
process of human creation. Capitalism is based on the production of commodities. In critical 
realism the concept of production has a more general meaning, as socioeconomic dynamics 
are processes, flows and relations which can never be fixed permanently
20
.  Lefebreve 
introduced the concept of the “production of space”21, Sum (2005) reflects on the production 
of hegemony
22
. This implies a shift from static concepts as territory and structure to dynamic 
concepts that express the evolving dimension of social reality: territorialisation, structuration, 
hegemony- and state-building, institution-building, empowerment. This profound shift in the 
way reality is represented privileges processes to the detriment of static representations. 
Studying socioeconomic development needs to embrace all aspects of development, 
comprising the social, the economic, the political, the ecological and the cultural. It has to 
proceed from the simple logic of capitalist accumulation to the complex study of culture, 
gender, ethnicity and socioecological metabolism. This implies a constant interplay of abstract 
and concrete analyses, of conceptual and field work which proceed in a spiral movement
23
. 
The historically-geographically determined form of capitalist relations is at the centre of 
analysis. Analysis has to lay open this historical-geographical concretisation of abstract 
concepts. Dialectical analysis avoids analytical fragmentation by context-sensitive research on 
the specific determinations which structure a concrete territory and delimit the range of 
strategies available for agency. This requires a holistic methodology, aware of the 
contradictions inherent in socioeconomic development, trusting in the multitude and variety 
of arguments rather than in the conclusiveness of a single one
24
. Economic and political 
events are contextualised and relate to path-dependent dynamics, an endeavour undertaken by 
an analysis of conjuncture. An awareness of the power of structures as well as the potential of 
agency is needed to fully exploit the horizon of possibilities
25
.  
Third, development as the conscious shaping of individual and collective life is intimately 
linked to knowledge. Relating knowledge to power has been at the root of European 
development. Over the last 500 years, Western civilisation has defined itself as the trustee of 
universal values like freedom, human rights and democracy
26
. In general, theories of 
development are often based on the concept of trusteeship understood as “the intent which is 
expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another”27. Trusteeship is 
either exercised by intellectuals, the state, political parties, international organisations or 
NGOs. Possession of superior knowledge is often seen as the justification of a hierarchy in 
development strategies. On the one hand, there are the agents of development such as the 
state, development agencies, capitalists or intellectuals. On the other hand, there is the mass, 
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the victims, beneficiaries and target groups which are often those who suffer from 
modernisation and progress. Within this discursive structure, there are – often politically and 
economically defined – subjects of development who shape growth and progress and there are 
– often socio-culturally defined – objects who receive social assistance. All too often, 
paternalism and authoritarianism are characteristics of developers
28
.  
Democratic socioeconomic development presupposes equal access to knowledge and 
overcomes the hiatus between actors and beneficiaries of development. Avoiding or using 
trusteeship requires self-criticism and reflexivity on the part of the intellectuals who are not 
part of the dominant class, but have to act within the given power structure. A new politics of 
knowledge and a new relationship between experts and the people as experts of their everyday 
life are needed. A participatory form of rationality transcends the boundaries of academic 
reasoning, entering in a broad democratic dialogue with society
29
. It opposes fragmentation 
and specialisation and relies on the transdisciplinary dialogue between different specialists 
and disciplines, within academic research as well as in politics and society. To tackle complex 
problems and different dimensions of development requires transdisciplinary research based 
on the joint elaboration of socially-useful research
30
. Joint political activism which uses 
academic knowledge as well as experience-based knowledge of activists might improve the 
effectiveness and rationality of politics. 
2. Analysing and shaping development 
DEMOLOGOS does not only propose a broad theoretical approach to analyse socioeconomic 
development, but dwells on utopia and discusses political alternatives. The future is the more 
or less shaped mode of possibilities of becoming. Development is about emerging spatio-
temporalities
31, including “the speculative leap into the unknown and into the unknowable”32. 
Shall-Is-Do links the idea of development and socioeconomic dynamics. Strategic planning of 
strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats, while similar to Shall-Is-Do, does not 
take the structural selectivity in socioeconomic dynamics into account which direct available 
strategies. Normative theories of development have to relate to ongoing processes of 
development, correlation of forces and power relations. What we want as our future is linked 
to existing structural constraints and available strategies. Shall-Is-Do deals with normative 
questions as well as with the politics of the possible which is sensitive to time-space 
constraints. While normative, analytical and practical elements are intertwined, they have to 
be separated in analysis for grasping all aspects of this contradictory process. If they are 
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confused theoretically, chaotic conceptions emerge
33
. In this section we outline this research 
programme aiming at integrating analytical and normative perspectives. 
2.1. Analysis of conjuncture (IS) 
Theories of political economy emphasise structural development. Institutionalism as well as 
the regulation approach stress regularities. In every territory specific socioeconomic relations 
are fixed. Spatio-temporal fixes are contextualised arrangements which structure the terrain, 
on which social struggles take place, empower or weaken actors and facilitate or complicate 
power strategies. The regulation approach studies accumulation and regulation dynamics 
separately to grasp development in its multiple dimensions. The stability of accumulation 
regimes and modes of regulation is always under threat. Actors´ capacity to stabilise spatio-
temporal fixes expresses the strength and depth of hegemony
34
. In DEMOLOGOS we propose 
the ASID- and CHID-model to study the dynamics of systemic reproduction. The stability of 
historically shaped spatio-temporal fixes decides whether a situation opens possibilities of 
more radical and enduring changes.
35
 While periods of stabilised accumulation facilitate 
coherent modes of regulation, crises open perspectives for deviance and change
36
. If 
consensual-oriented forms of domination begin to sway, force is becoming a more attractive 
means of conflict resolution.  
While structural analyses emphasize economic determinations, studying a conjuncture focuses 
on the political dimension of development
37
 as a “concrete analysis of the concrete 
situation”38. A conjuncture is an emblematic moment when the future is open and there is 
“uncertainty in the movement of structural time”39. These events force decisive political 
decisions which “later become instantiated in discourses and institutions”40. In 
DEMOLOGOS, we relate discourse analysis to political economy, as the power of capital is 
relational, embedded in all social relations and regularized via institutions. Discourse is an 
arrangement of knowledge and power, shaped by power relations and structuring power 
games and fostering consensus. It is crucial for constructing identities, imaginaries and 
hegemony
41
. To change the dominant discursive field is a key target for every political 
movement. Therefore, social and political movements need a common understanding of the 
current conjuncture and common objectives for a coherent praxis. 
In an analysis of conjuncture, a subject-and resource based concept of power in the tradition 
of Hobbes has to accompany a relational one which has become the dominant approach in 
critical social research. The stage of political events, apparently voluntaristic, have to be 
embedded in the longue durée of system reproduction of state, capital, gender and race 
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relations
42
. Emancipatory politics requires a power-sensitive analysis to empower actors to 
consciously transform society: Trade unions and left wing parties as the representatives of the 
working class have been the traditional subjects of left politics. These traditional actors and 
other social movements remain important, as they still dispose of crucial resources and 
occupy key nodal points in the power field of the state. Acting strategically in a given 
conjuncture requires knowledge not only of discursive, but also of organisational possibilities 
and limitations. Even progressive theories stress discourse, institutions, regulations and 
structures to the detriment of organisation, conflict and struggle. Gramsci´s famous war 
metaphor - a “war of position” - presupposes antagonistic social actors and political 
projects
43
. Their respective power depends on the terrain where conflict takes place. 
„Topography in this instance will always be the result of previous and current contest. In 
organizational life, such a field structure has to be reproduced by strategic agencies or it will 
be open to transformation“44. 
The integral state is a decisive organisational field for transformative agency which offers 
structural privileges to some but not all kinds of political strategy
45
. Political parties are of key 
importance, as they aggregate social interests and mediate between state and society. „From 
this perspective the party system involves far more than electoral strategies and the relation 
among voters, parties and leaders. For political parties actively link different spheres of 
society and different social forces and in securing the social bases of states, help to constitute 
specific state forms. In turn a crisis in the party system is often associated with a crisis in the 
state - especially if it affects the natural governing party“46. Lenin emphasised the crucial 
importance of political organisation of the oppressed to counter the power of state and capital. 
For Gramsci, the party was the collective prince, a collective will, to organise social change. 
But the traditional organisation of interests in political mass parties has changed over the last 
decades. „Most significant here are the loosening of the ties of representation between the 
parties of power and the power bloc and of those between the parties and the popular 
masses“47. While the political party as a progressive organisational form has been discredited, 
hope has been directed towards civil society. However, alternative strategies have often not 
been sufficiently aware of the Gramscian analytical definition of civil society as part of the 
enlarged state
48
. NGOs are only a minor part of civil society, while religious institutions and 
the media form that part of civil society which is powerfully stabilising existing structures of 
domination. Concentration and centralisation of the media are a crucial difficulty for rational 
public debate and progressive alternatives. New forms of governance that integrate civil 
society in development policies are always janus-faced. Their anti-statist bias and their plea 
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for autonomy have served well as a Trojan horse to dismantle the welfare state and the 
capacity to shape development
49
.  
2.2. Concrete Utopia (SHALL) 
The idea of development might appear as mere invention, but in general relate to its historical 
context and potentialities of a concrete situation. The slogan of “Another world is possible” is 
a contextualised answer to the Thatcherite “TINA - There is no alternative”, the profoundly 
anti-utopian leitmotif of neoliberalism. “Should be” concepts of development, from self-
reliance to sustainability, contain a utopian and oppositional element, but lack systematic 
reference to socioeconomic dynamics. It seems as if resistance against dominant strands of 
thinking is part of the power game in development studies, constitutive for its functioning
50
, 
as “contestation is always internalized within the discursive moment”51. But they remain 
limited to the world of ideas. These alternatives in thinking will never escape its discursive 
cooptation. Only praxis, the conscious, theory-based involvement in social struggles, the 
production of alternative hegemonies and new types of organisation can overcome misery and 
oppression. 
What shall be done here and now is an analytical, an ethical and a political question. While 
utopias as places of paradise are useless, reflections on a good state of development are 
necessary for the elaboration of political strategies. Theories of development have to be 
reflexive, never fixing the process or coming to an – illusory - final understanding of good 
development. Human actors can consciously intervene in shaping the future as a new moment 
of development. Although, development is about a good life, it is only through working that 
human beings sustain their lives. Capitalism has liberated productive forces in an 
unprecedented way and made capital, not human beings the main agent of development. But 
“capital cannot find a purpose for development. However much capital self-expands and 
acquires empirical complexity, the unifying principle remains simple because the mind of 
labour cannot find its universal expression of freedom in the production process”52. Capitalist 
development has increased life expectancy, but not reduced misery. It has advanced 
productive forces, but alienated labour under authoritarian conditions has remained 
widespread. Therefore, reducing the necessary working hours is a prerequisite of freedom
53
, 
and would allow new arrangements to link social, political and economic work and self-
realisation
54
. How people work, for whom they produce and how ones labour relates to nature 
are key topics of development. Changing the purpose of work can only be realised through the 
activity of production itself. Work in this sense is a creative, innovative and productive 
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activity which is part of the development of capitalist productive forces. Capital cannot exist 
without labour. The potential for free development or “the free play” of “physical and mental 
powers” exists in work as a general attribute of the labour process55. Self-development is not 
antagonistic to or outside of the productive sphere, as consciousness and knowledge are 
crucial productive forces. Human beings are not working bees, but architects 
56
 endowed with 
the will to create and to shape development
57
.  
2.3. Emancipatory politics (DO) 
Conscious action is reflexive as well as practical. A practical form of rationality (phronesis) 
involves a peculiar interlacing of being and knowledge
58
. Development as self-development 
deals with the subject-object-divide and refines the Foucauldian “art not to be governed that 
much”59. In development theories this is associated with grassroots development and bottom-
up approaches. It is the crucial problem of self-help and self-emancipation: How can the 
powerless empower themselves without help? How can the oppressed become liberators 
without external agents empowering them
60
? Goethe´s Dr. Faustus has become a prototype of 
a developer and the collateral problematic
61
. Developers are educators and occupy a 
privileged position due to its power and its merits. But who educates the educators
62
? Even a 
liberation pedagogue with deep respect for the people like Paulo Freire acknowledges the 
importance of leaders who abandon the dominant class and opt for the oppressed
63
 or emerge 
organically out of the subaltern classes
64
. There is a tension between the respect of autonomy 
and the intent to develop which can only be resolved by emancipatory practice. Experts are 
necessary to organize society, intellectuals organise political movements. But they have the 
tendency to deviate good development towards maintaining the hiatus of the educated and the 
not that educated. But by dissociating themselves from the mass, the elites foster their proper 
self-isolation. 
Transformative agency shapes the material world which shapes oneself. Analysing the 
socioeconomic dynamics of the revolution of 1848, Marx exemplifies that Menschen (men 
and women), developed and not that developed make history and shape development
65
. To 
change, not only to interpret the world, to educate the educators and to prove truth in praxis 
are some of the insights exposed in the “Theses on Feuerbach”. Merely representing the world 
critically, as proposed by apparently radicals who remain delinked from concrete 
revolutionary struggles is insufficient
66
. Over the last decades, the will to develop others has 
become discredited in academia as Euro-centric and paternalistic. Hope is put into 
spontaneous organisations of civil society, applying the liberal concept of the invisible hand 
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to politics
67
. In development studies, non- and post-development have been proposed as the 
alternative
68
. But non-development is only another form of socioeconomic dynamic – the 
conservation of the old, camouflaged as “a return to the past”69. Change, “creative 
destruction” is the only constant element of capitalist development. To understand the current 
situation and to identify a potential future is the starting point of emancipation. “What Marx 
called “the real movement” that will abolish the “existing state of things” is always there for 
the making and for the taking. That is what gaining the courage of our minds is all about”70. 
The intention to develop is crucial for achieving transformations as deliberate intervention. 
This needs courage and being prepared to use opportunities opened by concrete situations
71
.  
 
 
Figure 1: Development as a dialectical process in three steps
SHALL
Concrete Utopia
- reflexive and contextualised
ideas of good development 
- Socioeconomic imaginaries
- Collective visions
DO
Politics of the possible
- Organising alternatives
- Social innovations
- Alternative hegemonic practices
and discourses
IS
Analysis of concrete
situation (conjuncture)
- Emblematic moments
- Current dynamics of enlarged
state and economy
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3. Current challenges for the European left 
In this section we exemplify the model of Shall-Is-Do presented in section 2, analysing 
current challenges for the European left. Objectively, increasing inequality and insecurity due 
to finance-driven accumulation and carbon-based industrialisation are fertile grounds for a 
political movement that tries to overcome the resultant cleavages. Subjectively, however, the 
European left is in a pitiable condition, best symbolised by the dropping out of parliament of 
the prestigious Italian communist party, inheritress of Antonio Gramsci. We relate this to the 
broad diffusion of an elitist ideology within the left and the lack of an inspiring and 
mobilising idea of development. 
3.1. Finance-based accumulation, inequality and a post-
political elite 
The current conjuncture is characterised by an ongoing crisis of capitalism which followed the 
spatio-temporal fix of Fordism and Keynesianism. Together with the disaster of World War II 
the economic crisis of the 1930s formed the basis for the European anti-fascist consensus and 
the inclusive hegemony of a social form of democracy
72
. After 1945, even the conservatives 
were aware of the limits of fascism and of exclusionary liberal capitalism. Social struggle, 
war and the threat of the Soviet Union facilitated a consensus based on the dignity of labour 
and the citizenship of workers, an inclusive hegemony of freedom and equality within 
individual nation states. Keynesianism and Fordism as virtuous accommodations of class 
struggle accompanied the foundation and expansion of the European Union, the peaceful 
construction of a political union on an especially belligerent continent. At the end of the 
1960s, however, a sharp decline in the rate of profit in manufacturing, severe social unrest and 
the Vietnam War constituted a “political threat to economic elites”73. The objective of the 
ruling classes in the West was to restore class power by weakening the socio-spatial fix of 
national welfare, based on political and social citizenship. This implied a shift within the 
conservative parties from an inclusive one-nation project to a divisive two- nations’ project, 
first introduced by Thatcher
74
. The changes in accumulation and political strategies were 
profound. Outward-oriented finance-dominated accumulation and internationalisation of 
production and financial markets substituted industrial capital and inward-oriented 
strategies
75
. The internationalisation of production was intensified and finance capital was 
freed from national regulations. The accommodation between labour and capital in the 
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national power container was substituted by ongoing liberalisation and a more direct control 
of capital.  
In the G7, growth rates of GDP fell from 5,1% p.a. in the sixties to 2,1% p.a. in the nineties, 
unemployment rose in the same period from 3,1% to 6,6% while the increase in real income 
shrank from 5,6% to 0,6% in EURO 11 in this period
76
. “The top 1 per cent of income earners 
in Britain have doubled their share of the national income from 6,5 per cent to 13 per cent 
since 1982”77. The economic policies pursued in Europe have been used to impose a “greater 
degree of inequality”78, increasing wealth and insecurity, while maintaining poverty. High 
interest rates, low public investment and low rates of growth serve to put the system of social 
protection under severe pressure. In social policy the transition from welfare to workfare
79
 
links rights to obligations only for the poor, while the rich can buy themselves out of social 
obligations. Economic policies protect wealth instead of income, promoting high interest 
rates, subsidising private pension schemes and limit taxation on capital and property. In 2008, 
this is resulting in the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s
80
.  
The socioeconomic polarisation of a finance-led accumulation model has important political 
repercussions. The world economic crisis in the 1930s strengthened fascism. Today, 
socioeconomic crisis is again strengthening authoritarian solutions, but this time with the 
approval of important segments of the left. While neoliberalism was a reactionary ideology to 
restore class domination, the 1990s saw a renaissance of liberal thought on the political left. 
Ethical consumerism, free choice of sexual preferences, tolerance towards cultural diversity 
and an embrace of cosmopolitism indicate how deeply rooted liberalism is within the Western 
left. The EU is based on the principles of economic liberalism which are shared by all 
political forces of the establishment. Oppositional movements – be it trade unions or political 
parties – are weak and large parts of NGOs have to cooperate with the establishment, be it 
state or EU agencies or private sponsors, that can influence civil society by their funding 
decisions. There is a broad consensus in the main political parties (conservatives, social 
democrats, greens, and liberals) and the media, that a liberal order is the supreme form of a 
“constitution of liberty”81, a “self-regulating system of markets”82. Paraphrasing Nixon, we – 
this time restricted to the affluent and educated - are all liberals today. The Keynesian spatio-
temporal fix was substituted by a liberal one. But even liberals have become aware of the fact 
that a dismantled nation state cannot perform policies of good governance
83
. The neoliberal 
state enhances capabilities and the capacity to participate and succeed in the market economy 
by subsidising locational advantages like infrastructure provision, regional marketing and 
 14 
cooperation. Competitiveness as the basic political direction has been dominating European 
policies since the early 1990s and has left its marks in the Lisbon Treaty.  
As Nixon ascertained the dominance of Keynesianism in the 1970s, when it was already in 
decline, the same might be true of liberalism. US-policies only pay lip service to liberal values 
and free trade. Fiscal, monetary and trade policies in the USA are pragmatic, more Keynesian 
and protectionist than monetarist. This cannot be said about EU-policies which are more 
dogmatically liberal, except for the protectionist agricultural policies. There is a widespread 
liberal trust in overcoming conflict by rational deliberation which inspires European 
intellectuals like Habermas, Giddens and Beck. Their post-political vision substitutes political 
confrontation of interests by rational deliberation of policies and a neglect for antagonism and 
oppression
84
. A cosmopolitan left sticks to the upper and middle classes, while the popular 
classes are increasingly represented by right-wing populism which does not adhere to the 
post-political liberal establishment. It obtains popular support because it insists on inclusive 
strategies for natives, while discriminating against non-passport-owners. They use democratic 
tools at the national level for organizing their interests while undermining popular democracy 
at the same time
85
. The liberal mainstream which prohibits open public debate about 
socioeconomic alternatives – e.g. concerning the political and economic organisation of 
Europe beyond neoliberal capitalism – and moralises against politically incorrect attitudes 
creates a fertile ground for anti-systemic sentiments and anti-democratic attitudes. Liberal 
hegemony is contested by a generalized discredit of politics by common people. The left has 
no alternative political project to offer. While the cultural dimension of Gramscian politics is 
appreciated, there is widespread scepticism about the possibility of jointly constructing 
hegemony. Social movements often abdicate state power. Political parties, which represented 
social interests in the past, like the social democrats or the greens, have been delinking 
themselves from their former clientele. Articulations hardly exist as there is no common idea 
of good development. 
But the politics of inequality is not restricted to internal policies. Geopolitics and geo-
economics are changing profoundly as well
86
. Until recently, European integration was an 
inward oriented continental project. Over the last years, however, European foreign policy has 
become increasingly active and interventionist. Europe has successfully given emphasis to 
export-oriented strategies, increasing Europe’s share in world trade87. Foreign trade policies 
oscillate between the promotion of liberal principles and neo-mercantilist strategies in favour 
of European corporations
88
. The emphasis on competitiveness is accompanied by 
militarisation and uneven access to global resources
89
. In the 1990s, the USA and the EU were 
 15 
able to foster international coordination by fostering good governance and creating 
institutions of global governance, based on human rights, democracy and market economies. 
The newly formed structures and mechanisms of coordination supported a mode of 
development designed to fit capitalist accumulation strategies and building a consensual 
world order of peace, markets and democracy. The emerging anti-globalisation movement 
was able to question this consensus and is calling for regulation of markets and corporations. 
Russia, Latin America and China have opted for political regimes which diverge from the 
liberal consensus and challenge the geo-economic world order. The new geopolitics is 
becoming multi-polar. At the same time war against terror has put violence, police 
surveillance and imperialism back on the agenda. The Euro-American way of life, based on 
uneven resource depletion, is spreading while resources are becoming scarce, increasing 
geoeconomic competition
90
. 
3.2. Equal freedom for all 
The European left has an idealistic and harmonious understanding of good development, 
compatible with Amartya Sen´s idea of development as freedom
91
. But aspiring freedom in 
societies structured by cleavages of class, race and gender is difficult. Enlarging capabilities 
and freedoms of the disadvantaged quickly touches structural limits which have become 
naturalised by neoliberal discourse. TINA has become hegemonic. The apotheosis of the 
present and widespread collective amnesia complicate creative strategies to shape 
development, as “invention is helpless without tradition”92. But the past can be mobilised to 
construct the future, as Chavez demonstrates in Venezuela. Although all utopia need a horizon 
beyond capitalism, patriarchy and racism, certain conjunctures demand a defensive strategy of 
safeguarding certain historical values and dreams within capitalism
93
. We propose the 
republican utopia of the French Revolution as the concrete utopia of the 21th century in 
Europe. Defending its values is becoming, once again, a revolutionary undertaking. The 
republican ideal of social citizenship does not overcome capitalist class structure, but gives 
dignity and rights to those without access to means of production and the control of 
knowledge. European history shows how knowledge and power have been related, how 
dominant interests have used the educated for their class and imperial interests. European 
trusteeship of civilisation and economic progress went hand in hand with genocide, 
colonialism and imperialism: Although Europe and the US are market leaders in clean 
technologies the West remains the main responsible for global pollution and climatic change. 
Hypocrisy was a constant companion, as European values are neither universally valid nor 
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intrinsically superior to non-European. The dialectics of European enlightenment is linked to 
the dialectics of capitalist development
94
. The French revolution was and remains a scandal: It 
postulated and implemented equal rights for earls, carpenters and even slaves. Until today, 
this republican credo of equal citizenship has not been digested by European society. The 
promise of citizenship has shown to the profoundly hypocritical for second-generation 
immigrants, school systems in a lot of countries remain segregated by class and the labour 
market is still unevenly gendered. Freedom, equality and solidarity remain a promise to be 
urgently realised in a society which is increasingly suffering from the disintegrative effects of 
enlarged freedoms of a few and generalised inequality and insecurity.  
Possessive individualism emphasises “personalized private property vested in the self”95, as it 
has a monadic understanding of the self. The reactionary utopia of neoliberalism which 
promotes freedom against others can only be realized by a Hobbesian form of 
authoritarianism which manages socioeconomic and ecological constraints in favour of the 
few: dominant nations and classes. A progressive utopia has to call for freedom for all, not 
only the wealthy
96
. Assuming that “amour de soi is the basis of altruism, as only the 
empowered can empower”, “a relational conception of social life avoids the pitfalls of 
individualism and collectivism alike”97 Ego-centric individualism faces its proper limits in a 
complex division of labour which cannot avoid climate change, the food and energy crises, 
thereby showing the necessary sociability of human beings. Self-development and world 
development are linked, as socio-ecological problems call for collective solutions which 
respect a social form of individuality. In 1844, the Communist Manifesto aspired for a 
synthesis of the free development of everybody and all
98
. In 1967, the catholic encyclical 
“Populorum progressio” defined true development as the integral development of all, 
specified from a feminist point of view as indicators of life quality
99
. This shows a 
convergence in philosophy about the content of a good society
100
. What astonishes is the lack 
of zeal to realize it.  
3.3. Organising democratic and egalitarian alternatives 
The European left, disarticulated by the end of state socialism, the crisis of social democracy 
and elitist attitudes, faces multiple challenges. Neoliberal reforms have depoliticised 
universities and the commercial media have become the interpreters of the current 
conjuncture. A first task is, therefore, to reconstitute public spaces and alternative media for 
common deliberation about Europe´s future
101
. Political education and efforts to jointly read 
the world differently from the pre-given dominant discourses is crucial for the effectiveness of 
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Shall-Is-Do as a model for emancipatory agency. Our analysis of conjuncture stresses the fact 
that finance-based accumulation and liberal policies have increased the cleavages between 
winners and losers. Left politics is always about overcoming class-, race- or gender-divided 
societies to create a society and polis of the equal. To represent the losers of capitalist 
modernisation is a difficult task, as the European left is profoundly permeated by anti-popular 
sentiments. This prejudice-based attitude stresses the cleavage between the educated and 
civilised and the uneducated and barbarian. It resembles the 19
th
 century attitudes of culturally 
progressive liberals like J.S. Mill who had no problem in assuring that “despotism is a 
legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians”102. To put it in a nutshell, a 
pluralist left has to abandon its elitist isolation and focus on the fight against an updated 
version of authoritarianism. Unfortunately, it has accepted a discursive field – the cultural 
domain – which the extreme right has already appropriated by linking culture to race103. In 
fact, however, the struggle is not about ideas, but about material life, ways of living and 
working. Good housing, health care and education, together with good work and decent 
wages are the aspirations of natives and migrants. Up to the 20
th
 century, the left has aimed at 
linking intellectuals and the people, understanding ordinary people and their aspirations. 
Today, these efforts are undertaken more by the extreme right and religious 
fundamentalists
104
.  
While the extreme-right defends workers on the ground of their national citizenship, the left 
has to elaborate an inhabitant-based concept of citizenship which ends discrimination between 
fractions of wage earners. Etienne Balibar´s concept of égaliberté connects the absence of 
discrimination to that of repression. Equality is the very premise upon which democratic 
politics is constituted
105
. If we take this seriously, the acceptance of the equality of all 
inhabitants of a territory becomes the starting point for emancipatory and democratic 
politics
106
. The adversary of the working class in any country is not the immigrant worker, but 
rent-based privileges of capitalists, native or foreign alike. The left has to vigorously engage 
itself in experimenting. Openness, curiosity and collective creativity have to guide the search 
for good development. Social innovations offer no simple recipes and ready-available best 
practice models to be copied. Experiments are required that connect social innovations with 
socio-spatial organisations different from the all-embracing logic of profit and 
commodification
107
.  
Public spaces for reading the world, abandoning its elitist inclinations and fostering a culture 
of experimentation are the pre-requisites for an alternative hegemonic project which has to 
cover other ways of producing. This includes a state project based on an open and public 
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state. Europe, the motherland of democracy, is currently suffering a severe erosion of 
democracy. There is the danger that an elite destroys democracy in the name of freedom
108
. 
Existing national forms of representative democracy have been weakened, while European 
governance offers no republican form of democracy to constitute popular sovereignty. This 
always favours reactionary forces. The merit of democratic politics is not the search for 
consensus, but consists in transforming antagonism in agonism, enemies in adversaries
109
. 
Democracy is not appreciated because it automatically leads to better decisions, but because it 
permits antagonism to be expressed in public terrain. Parliamentary democracy, a 
constitutional state and non-violence are basic civilising institutions which have to be 
defended. Beyond these defensive measures, a broad, but coherent alliance needs to re-invent 
European democracy by coupling political with social democracy, direct with representative 
democracy. Founding new progressive parties, like Die Linke in Germany, fighting for 
internal democracy in existing political parties and new mechanisms of accountability for 
elected representatives vis a vis their constituency are important. Social movements have to 
deliberately overcome their inclination to single-issue-politics and foster political alliances 
with other movements, parties and trade unions. 
This emerging democratic politics of scale has to be based on common European values 
expressed in political regulations of socio-ecological and politico-economic development. 
Subsidiarity should be the principle in implanting context-sensitive diverse concretisations of 
general rules. The most inspiring experiences in this respect no longer come from Europe. A 
new democratic form of governance, based on the idea of a public state, was successfully 
implemented in Porto Alegre via popular participation in the local and regional budget. It 
constructed a public and open form of state, integrated social movements in public affairs, 
redistributed public money and regained a democratic space for open discussion and the 
confrontation of opposing political projects
110
.  
Beyond mere political democracy, it has to cover economic democracy and give special 
emphasis to a democratic organisation of production. All forms of work have to be valorised 
against rents obtained from capital or real estate. Trade unions and emerging organisations of 
precariously self-employed are key actors for this hegemonic project. Good work should be 
socially and ecologically useful. Alternative socioeconomic development must elaborate 
forms of economic democracy and innovative forms of democratic socialism which take 
achievements and failures of reformist strategies into account to clarify the space of 
manoeuvre available within and beyond capitalism
111
. New forms of accountability and 
ownership have to be tested and the emerging solidarity economy has to be promoted
112
. 
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Finally, democracy and welfare neither end at the borders of nations nor of a fortress Europe. 
The reactionary project of inequality, which might take even more authoritarian traces if the 
crisis deepens, is directed against the European wage earners and precariously self-employed 
in general, but especially against migrants. A pluralist left which organises democratic and 
egalitarian alternatives must think and act on a world-wide scale. It must criticise aberrations 
at home, like human rights violations against migrants, as well as abroad, where human rights 
issues camouflage economic or geo-strategic interest. European actors can only assume an 
ethical position in world politics, if homework concerning human rights is done. This means a 
critical stance towards European hypocrisy of double-standards. Only then, the European left, 
internally pluralist, can be a prime mover in fostering a multi-polar and pluralist world.  
Figure 2: Current Challenges for the European left
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